LETTER TO THE EDITOR:

Iraq effort lacked civil affairs focus

Earle Malkin, Las Vegas

Sat, Oct 11, 2008 (2:03 a.m.)

Regarding the Las Vegas Sun’s Wednesday editorial, “Right role for the Army? Latest manual says soldiers should be trained for peacekeeping, nation-building”:

Remember the movie “Bell for Adano”? It portrayed the military government units of the U.S. Army in Italy after World War II. They were not used in the Korean conflict, but the Army and Marines had “civil affairs” personnel in Vietnam.

The Army maintained a large cadre of trained officers and enlisted personnel in what were first named “military government” units and later named “civil affairs” units, both in the active force and in the reserves. It was in those units that people with civilian specialties were recruited and trained for post-combat operations. However, in the late 1970s most of those reserve units, including mine, were eliminated for reasons that escape me.

When we went into Iraq and after the “combat period,” the Baathists were removed from the Iraqi administration and we had no or insufficient personnel in the country to handle the civilian activities. Now, at least, the military is recognizing the need for that training and for those units. We did this in Germany, Italy and Japan; we could have done this in Iraq.

Discussion: 1 comment so far…

By glenn54509

10/11/08 at 7:48 a.m.

Suggest removal

While the efforts at reconstruction were misdirected and many times a failure since March 2003, stating there was a lack of civil affairs focus is incorrect. In fact in 2003, at the start combat operations in Iraq, the army had one Battalion of active duty civil affairs and in the Army Reserve, four regional level commands, seven division and corps level units (Brigades), and 27 tactical units (battalions).

In 2003, the Army mobilized and deployed over 43% of its total force and the Marine Corps sent 50% of their force. By 2005, the Army and Marine corps had completely used up their civil affairs capacity and were training and transitioning other units and personnel from non-civil affairs units into the career field. In fact, the total number of civil affairs personnel deployed in Iraq right now is higher than at any point between 2004 and 2007.

The real issue is not a lack of civil affairs but a lack of effective training in military governance and support to civil authority, and the development of a coherent plan across the entire spectrum.

Finally, with any organization and plan, there must be effective transitions as people and units come in and out. This did not occur until General Petreaus arrived as commander of MNCI-I.

If Earle Malkin is interested, he can search the web for hundreds of articles on the civil affairs units working worldwide supporting the Global War on Terrorism, he can visit the United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, NC, or he can search out, in Las Vegas, the over 34 members of the Charlie Company, 404th Civil Affairs Battalion (Special Operations), that deployed in 2003 to Northern Iraq with the 10th Special Forces Group. All will help him learn the role that his old branch is now doing.

Thank you Earle for serving, but please do not denigrate the 26 US service members who have been killed in this war while assigned to civil affairs units. As a percentage, these units have some of the highest casualty rates of any type unit in Iraq or Afghanistan.